In the years following the Trilogy, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit became transparently activist and set aside labor-arbitration decisions at a disturbingly accelerated pace. This judicial proclivity to nullify arbitration decisions with which some judges simply disagreed reached its zenith in 2006 in the Sixth Circuit's decision of Michigan Family Resources, Inc. v In Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, the district court referred the parties, including a group of plaintiffs who were both registered and unregistered copyright-holders and the owners and publishers of an online database, to mediation because of the growing size and complexity of the lawsuit. 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010). The plaintiffs moved for the district court to certify a class for settlement and to approve the settlement agreement, which the district court did. Id at 1242. The court of appeals held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to approve a settlement with respect to claims arising from the infringement of unregistered works, but the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the district court in fact had the authority to approve the settlement. Id. at 1242-43. The Supreme Court expressed no opinion on the merits of the settlement. Id. at 1243-44.
The Court in Union Pacific Railroad v. Brotherhood ofLocomotive Engineers & Trainmen
General Committee of Adjustment held that a panel of the National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB) failed "to conform, or confine itself' to the jurisdiction awarded to it by Congress when the panel refused to adjudicate five cases "for lack ofjurisdiction." 130 S. Ct. 584, 590-95, 598-99 (2009). The union was not satisfied with the results of the grievance procedures specified in its collective-bargaining agreement and sought arbitration before the NRAB. Id. at 593. Dissatisfied with the NRAB's order, the union filed a petition for review in district court, which affirmed the NRAB's order. Id. at 594. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the NRAB's proceedings violated due process. Id at 595. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment but held that the framework should have been statutory, not constitutional. Id. at 596, 599. Congress had authorized the NRAB to adjudicate unsettled grievances of railroad employees following internal-resolution procedures, as well as to prescribe rules for the presentation and processing of claims. Id. at 590. Ultimately, only Congress defines the NRAB's jurisdiction. Id. The Court reasoned that if the NRAB lacked authority to define the jurisdiction of its panels, then certainly the panels themselves lacked that same authority; therefore, the panel's refusal to adjudicate those cases failed to confine it to matters within the scope of its jurisdiction. Id at 590-91.
6. See infra Part II. 
S.
Sutton's powerful concurrence, however, presciently cautioned the unduly activist majority that it must conform to the Trilogy principles: If we are to take seriously what the Supreme Court said in this area and what it has done (to my knowledge it has not authorized the vacation of a labor arbitration award since 1960), I do not understand how we can alter the parties' delegation of decision-making authority in this case merely because one of those parties (the employer) now thinks that the arbitrator botched the interpretation of the contract. At most, the employer has shown that the arbitrator misapprehended the meaning of the contract and misapprehended the rules for construing contracts. As the district court rightly reasoned and as our per curiam opinion correctly agrees, the collective bargaining agreement required parity only as to cost-of-living increases from the federal government, said nothing about employer-funded cost-of-living increases and established the minimum increases that union employees could expect in a given year, increases tied in no way to the increases given to non-union employees. Read together, the provision of limited parity requirements and the provision of express minimum-salary requirements for union employees strongly imply the exclusion of an overarching parity requirement between union and non-union employees. And that implication is strong enough that the arbitrator should not have pinned his interpretation of the contract on the parties' practices in implementing it. If a district court in a diversity case had interpreted the contract in this manner, no one would doubt that we should correct the error.
But that of course is not the point. An arbitrator selected by the parties, not a federal district court judge, interpreted this contract, and that makes all the difference. We have here none of the tell-tale signs for vacating an award: bias by the arbitrator, a conflict of interest, a transparent effort to "dispense his own brand of industrial justice," or a dispute that is not arbitrable. Instead we have an arbitrator who certainly was "arguably construing" the contract and who just as certainly made a "serious error" in construing the contract, a confluence of circumstances that does not invest us with authority to "overturn [the] decision." Throughout his ten-page opinion, the arbitrator references, quotes and analyzes the contract. Even the flaw in his analysis does not disprove that he was attempting to construe the contract. "[T]he above language," he says, "becomes ambiguous because of the Employer's prior decision Inc. v [Vol. 60:47to characterize both its individual payment and its payment from the federal funding source as [a cost-of-living increase]." Whether the "becomes" phrase was a slip of the pen or a slip in thought, it was still "the above language"-the contract language-that he was trying to figure out. Even the district court characterized these efforts as construction: "[T]he Arbitrator considered evidence to aid in construing the [agreement] when, in fact, no construction was necessary." All that happened here is that the arbitrator committed a legal error, a serious legal error to be sure, but an error of interpretation nonetheless, which does not authorize us to vacate the award. Judge Sutton's wise counsel for judicial restraint became the controlling rationale when the Sixth Circuit, upon rehearing en banc, returned to conformance with Trilogy principles. 9 This Article examines the three-year period following Michigan Family Resources, 2007-2010, to assess the Sixth Circuit's treatment of laborarbitration decisions because the circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the original decision.' 0 Especially when compared with its prior maverick behavior, the Sixth Circuit has become a veritable model of appellate court judicial restraint.'' This is certainly not to say that the horizon is utterly quiescent. It is obvious that several other circuits were, and are, continuing to cavalierly side-step Trilogy principles in order to vacate labor-arbitration decisions with which federal judges simply disagree on the substantive merits. 
15.
See supra note 5.
BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE STEELWORKERS TRILOGY
A. United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co.
In United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., a union employee brought an action for compensation benefits while he was out of work because of an injury. 16 The parties settled after receiving a physician's diagnosis of permanent partial-disability. 17 The union later filed a grievance on the ground that "the seniority provision of the collective bargaining agreement" entitled the employee to return to work.' 8 The employer refused to arbitrate and the union brought an action in district court.
The district court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the employee was barred from claiming "any seniority or employment rights" because he had accepted the permanent partial-disability settlement. 20 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment, though reasoning differently; it held that the grievance was frivolous and not subject to arbitration.21
The Supreme Court reversed, explaining that "[a]rbitration should have been ordered" because there was a "dispute between the parties as to 'the meaning, interpretation and application' of the collective bargaining agreement."22 The Supreme Court held that courts should not judge the merits of such claims, but 23 instead leave arbitrators to interpret the contract.
The Court warned that, "[w]hen the judiciary undertakes to determine the merits of a grievance under the guise of interpreting the grievance procedure of collective bargaining agreements, it usurps a function ... entrusted to the arbitration tribunal." that an arbitration clause is the quid pro quo for a no-strike clause. 26 The Court stated that "the agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely those that a court may deem to be meritorious. There is no exception in the 'no strike' clause and none therefore should be read into the grievance clause, since one is the quid pro quo for the other. In another case of the Trilogy, when an employer began contracting out maintenance work and consequently laid off union employees, the union filed a grievance charging that the employer induced a partial lockout of union employees in violation of the "no lockout" provision of their collectivebargaining agreement.28 The district court granted the employer's motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the agreement did not empower the arbitrator to review the defendant's business judgment. 29 It also held that the collective-bargaining agreement did not limit the management's function of contracting out work. 30 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that matters which were strictly a function of management could not be arbitrated because they were excluded from the grievance procedure.
The Supreme Court's decision reflected the federal policy of "promot[ing] industrial stabilization through the collective bargaining agreement." 32 The Court emphasized arbitration's place in the labor setting, noting that "arbitration is the substitute for industrial strife". The Court disagreed with the lower courts' view that complaints regarding contracting out work were automatically excluded from this agreement's grievance provision, citing the agreement's language that, if "differences" arose, the grievance procedure would apply. 34 Accordingly, the Court reversed on the ground that a dispute "as to the meaning and application of the provisions" of the collectivebargaining agreement was subject to arbitration. 35 The Court stated that "[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." 36 Thus, because the issue of contracting out work was not explicitly excluded by the arbitration clause, the parties were obligated to resolve the claim through arbitration. Court opinions and commentators often cite to the Supreme Court's characterization that "the grievance machinery under a collective bargaining agreement is at the very heart of the system of industrial self-government." 3 9 When the employer refused to arbitrate, the union brought suit for "specific enforcement of the arbitration provisions of the agreement." 40 The collective-bargaining agreement included an arbitration clause and particular terms governing employee discharge. 4 1 The district court ordered arbitration. 42 The arbitrator found that the employees should have been suspended for, at most, ten days, and therefore the discharge was unjustified4 3 Additionally, the arbitrator "awarded reinstatement with back pay, minus pay for a 10-day suspension and such sums as these employees received from other employment." 44 When the employer refused to comply with the award, the union petitioned the district court for enforcement, and the district court ordered the employer to comply.
45
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit found that the award was 46 unenforceable, naming three reasons.
First, it held that the award did not specify the exact amount to be deducted from the back pay. 47 Second, the court held that it could not enforce an award for "back pay subsequent to the date of termination of the collective-bargaining agreement."48 Finally, it held that because the collective-bargaining agreement had expired, the award for reinstatement of the discharged employees was unenforceable.
49
The Supreme Court agreed with the Fourth Circuit that the district court's judgment should be modified in order that both parties could complete arbitration to reach a definite determination of the amounts due to the wrongfully discharged employees. 50 [A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. 56 This succinctly summarizes the nature and role of an arbitrator in adjudicating disputes between employers and employees in the context of a collective-bargaining agreement. (discussing why the Supreme Court agreed to hear Garvey and its summary disposition despite the fact that "there was no division between the Circuits on a point of law, ordinarily a prerequisite for Supreme Court consideration"). [Vol. 60:47 scholars, and practitioners across the labor-law spectrum because the Sixth Circuit's activist approach was contrary to the principles of collective bargaining and arbitration. 6 1 After 2007, however, the court finally turned the page on its unorthodox approach and rendered a decision on rehearing that conformed to the Trilogy standards articulated by the Supreme Court. case, the employer, Michigan Family Resources (MFR), filed a complaint against the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), a union representing some MFR employees.65 MFR sought to have an arbitration award in the union's favor vacated, and the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of the employer.66 SEIU appealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit, seeking an enforcement of the arbitration award in accordance with the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement negotiated between the parties. 67 The collective-bargaining agreement between MFR and its SEIUrepresented employees included several articles outlining which MFR employees would be entitled to annual-wage increases.68 The agreement also contained a provision requiring "the parties to arbitrate any disputes that they cannot resolve on their own," mandating that the decision of the arbitrator to be "final and binding upon both parties." 69 After MFR notified its union employees that their annual wage increase would be 2.5%, though the nonunion employees' increase would be 4.0%, SEIU filed a grievance against MFR. 70 Although the pay increase for union employees satisfied the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement, the grievance alleged that the collectivebargaining agreement "required parity between union and non-union employees."n The arbitrator issued an award in favor of SEIU, determining that, though the agreement was "not entirely clear" on whether parity was required, the ambiguity must be resolved based on MFR's prior behavior in granting specific wage increases. 72 Because MFR had a practice of issuing identical increases to union and non-union employees in the past, the arbitrator granted an award in favor of the union. 73 MFR sought to vacate the award in federal court, and the district court granted its motion for summary judgment. 74 The court held that "the Arbitrator went beyond the express terms of the [collective-bargaining agreement] by imposing additional requirements upon the parties and considering past practices, which are specifically disclaimed by the [collective-bargaining agreement's] waiver provisions."" On appeal, the Sixth Circuit displayed its tendency to thoroughly review arbitration awards, despite the standard for review being "one of the narrowest standards of judicial review in all of American jurisprudence." 76 In doing so, the court distinguished between arbitration awards that disregard the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement and those that do not, affording itself the ability to vacate the award when the former type of award presents itself. 77 Delineating the distinction requires a determination of whether an award "draws its essence" from the collective-bargaining agreement. 78 To do this, the Sixth Circuit employed a four-part test, whereby if any prong was satisfied, the award was vacated. 9 The Sixth Circuit explained that
II. FROM MAVERICK ACTIVISM TO
[a]n award does not "draw its essence" from the collective bargaining agreement . . . when any of the following is true: "(1) it conflicts with express terms of the agreement; (2) it imposes additional requirements not expressly provided for in the agreement; (3) it is not rationally supported by or derived from the agreement, or (4) it is based on general considerations of fairness and equity instead of the exact terms of the agreement."
80
The Sixth Circuit interpreted the parties' collective-bargaining agreement and found that the agreement did not require the wage increases to be at parity. 8 I As a result, the court, applying the four-part test, concluded that "[w]hen the arbitrator required parity in employer-funded salary increases, he thus imposed an 'additional requirement not expressly provided for in the agreement,' one that 'conflict [ed] In reaching its ultimate decision, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged the union's argument, supported by Supreme Court precedent, that "an arbitration award should not be vacated merely because the arbitrator commits a legal error in construing the collective bargaining agreement." 84 However, as the concurrence illustrated, 85 despite the Supreme Court precedent in terms of reviewing arbitration awards, the Sixth Circuit felt bound by its four-part test. 86 The Sixth Circuit's tenacious activism trumped the Trilogy.
Judge Sutton concurred, but identified a variety of inherent problems with the Sixth Circuit's approach to arbitral decisions, particularly regarding the four-part test. Identifying the Steelworkers Trilogy as the Supreme Court's desire "to end the federal courts' hostility to labor-arbitration awards," 88 Judge Sutton acknowledged that "'[t]he refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements."' 8 9 Furthermore, Judge Sutton drew inspiration from Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, a Supreme Court decision directing that "[s]o long as 'an arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, the fact that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overtum his decision."' 90 The Trilogy continues to stand for the principle that a court should refrain from interpreting contract language where the contract provides that the matter at issue be submitted to arbitration. deference to the arbitrator's decision, as Judge Sutton pointed out, is that the parties bargained for the arbitrator's, not the court's, construction of the agreement. Thus, "the courts have no business overruling [the arbitrator because their interpretation of the contract is different from his." 9 Accordingly, Judge Sutton stated that the court's standard for review of arbitration awards was the narrowest he could identify; nonetheless, he concurred in vacating the arbitration award in Michigan Family Resources, Inc.94 Even though Judge Sutton felt bound by the Sixth Circuit's use of the fourpart test to review arbitration awards and concurred in the opinion as a result, he was uneasy about the test's application. 95 He stated, "This formulation, I respectfully believe, has made it easier to vacate an arbitration award on the merits than the Supreme Court meant it to be." 96 Specifically, Judge Sutton maintained that the first two prongs of the four-part test were directly contradictory to Supreme Court precedent. 97 Both prongs, Judge Sutton We have here none of the tell-tale signs for vacating an award: bias by an arbitrator, a conflict of interest, a transparent effort to "dispense his own brand of justice," or a dispute that is not arbitrable. Instead we have an arbitrator who certainly was "arguably construing" the contract and who just as certainly made a "serious error" in construing the contract, a confluence of circumstances that does not invest us with authority to "overturn [the] decision." Id. at 660 (quoting Garvey, 532 U.S. at 509).
95. Id at 663 ("Because I am bound by our four-part test and our practice in applying it, I feel obliged to concur in the decision vacating this arbitration award-even though this case strikes me as presenting precisely the kind of 'serious error' that the Supreme Court has expected we would permit arbitrators to make.").
96. Id. at 661. Judge Sutton recognized that the Supreme Court urged that the "'proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements' is to 'refus[e] . . . to review the merits of an arbitration award."' Id (quoting Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 596). Therefore, Judge Sutton found that Supreme Court precedent requires that, absent "fraud" or the "arbitrator's dishonesty," arbitration awards should be upheld "so long as the arbitrator is 'arguably construing' the contract, even when that construction results in a 'serious error." ' Id. (quoting Garvey, 532 U.S. at 509).
97. Id. ("Nor is it clear to me how the first two parts of our test--(1) whether the award conflicts with 'express terms' of the agreement or (2) whether the award 'imposes additional [Vol. 60:47 offered, "seem to be in tension with Garvey's directive that a 'serious error' in interpreting a contract does not provide an independent ground for vacating an arbitration award so long as the arbitrator was 'arguably construing' the contract."98 After adopting the four-part test, the Sixth Circuit vacated an alarming number of arbitration awards, 99 nearly twenty-seven percent of all labor-arbitration cases it heard, illustrating "that the four-part test has been anything but deferential in application."' 00
The Sixth Circuit's decision to vacate the arbitration award had a heavy impact on the labor-management community, proving once again that a determined activist court can almost always semantically contrive a rationale to overrule an arbitrator's award despite the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement specifying that arbitration would be the sole and final authority for dispute resolution between the parties.' 0 ' The Michigan Family Resources, Inc. decision was met with much opposition urging the court to reexamine its methodology.1 02 For example, the National Academy of Arbitrators ("the Academy")1 03 filed an amicus brief with the court, stressing the necessity of requirements that are not expressly provided in the agreement ' an be reconciled with Supreme Court precedent."). 101. See Brief of National Academy of Arbitrators, supra note 7, at 11-13, 15-16 ("Had the parties wanted the Court's judgment about the meaning of their contract, they could have easily agreed to forego arbitration and pursue remedies in court. Here, they opted for arbitration and the benefits it affords, typically identified as faster and less costly than litigation and, most important, final.").
102. See -2564 ) (urging the court to abandon its four-part test and reverse the judgment of the district court); Brief of National Academy of Arbitrators, supra note 7, at 2 (advocating that the court abandon its four-part test because it "exceeds the scope of judicial review permitted by Supreme Court decisions and undermines the parties' agreement that arbitration awards are to be final and binding").
103. Founded in 1947, the National Academy of Arbitrators is a neutral organization whose principal purpose is to establish and foster the highest standards of integrity, competence, honor, and character among those engaged in the arbitration of labor-management disputes on a professional basis; to secure the acceptance of and adherence to the Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-Management Disputes . . . ; to promote the study and understanding of the arbitration of labor-management and employment disputes .... upholding arbitration awards and encouraging the Sixth Circuit to "abandon its four-part test for determining whether an arbitrator's award draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement." 1 04 Using the four-part test required the court to assign meaning to the contract language, but the Academy argued that such practice "far exceed[ed] the scope of judicial review permitted by Supreme Court decisions and undermine[d] the parties' agreement that arbitration awards are to be final and binding," ultimately subverting the parties' bargain and the arbitration process. t os In applying the test, the court must assess the merits of the case, an action inappropriate for a court reviewing arbitration awards. o0 The major problem with applying the four-part test is that each prong "focuses on whether the arbitrator's decision was correct, not whether his decision was based-or even arguably based--on . . . the contract."' 0 7 Finally, in its brief arguing for the abandonment of the four-part test, the Academy explained that it would not review the case at issue in detail because the arguments advanced in Judge Sutton's concurring opinion could not be improved. Despite the court's vacation of the arbitration award, Judge Sutton correctly identified that " [a] ll that happened [in the case was] that the arbitrator committed a legal error, a serious legal error to be sure, but an error of interpretation nonetheless, which does not authorize us to vacate the award."l09
Brief of National Academy of Arbitrators, supra note 7, at 1 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Id at 2. The Academy thought it was appropriate to file a brief with the court because the court's decision in Michigan Family Resources, Inc. had "the potential for disturbing the salutary regime established by the Supreme Court's prior decisions," and the involvement of the law in the arbitration process "should serve to effectuate the purposes for which employers and unions have developed voluntary arbitration." Id. at 1-2.
105. Id at 2-4, 6-7. The test, the Academy argued, "is inconsistent with the standards articulated by the Supreme Court and misconstrues [the Sixth Circuit's] role in the dispute settlement process of arbitration." Id. at 3. 106. Id. at 2.
Id. at 6.
Parties who are dissatisfied with the result of a case can appeal to a court for a different interpretation, arguing that the "plain meaning" of the contract language compels a rejection of the arbitrator's reading of the agreement. Using the plain meaning rule inevitably results in cases like the one at issue here, where the Court reversed the arbitrator's award because there was only "one proper interpretation." Id. at 10. But, through consenting to an arbitration agreement, "the parties made it clear ... that the Court was to play no such role in resolving their disputes. Here, the parties hired the arbitrator to do that and, whether his decision was correct or not, they agreed to be bound by his work. [Vol. 60:47 This is precisely the unstable ground on which the initial decision stood. 110 The Sixth Circuit returned to fealty to Trilogy principles, which Judge Sutton illustrated so particularly in his concurrence with the original decision,"' and abandoned its infamous four-part test."12 Profound deference to the arbitrator's decision is "consistent with the parties' bargain and . . . flaws at any rate can be corrected by the remedy of choosing better arbitrators.""i 3 Arbitration provides an expeditious forum for labor-management disputes that might otherwise escalate to strikes, lockouts, or other interferences with production.l14 However, for arbitration to be a successful mechanism, "the process [must] end[] when the arbitrator rules."" 5 Accordingly, where court decisions "encourage the disappointed party to seek review, thus continuing the dispute the arbitration agreement was intended to end," the underlying goals of the process cannot be met.116 On rehearing, Judge Sutton appropriately delivered the opinion of the court in conformity with the letter and the spirit of the Trilogy.1 7 The Sixth Circuit reversed its original decision and entered an order enforcing the arbitrator's award." 8 The court abandoned its use of the four-part test, determined that the arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority in resolving the dispute, and found no fraud or dishonesty present." 9 In doing so, the court concluded that the arbitrator was arguably construing the contract in determining that parity must be present in wage increases.12 Because there was nothing to indicate that the arbitrator made more than an error, though possibly a "serious" one, when interpreting the agreement, the court exercised its proper authority and deferred to the parties' assent to resolve disputes through arbitration.121
Deviating from its initial approach in the case, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged, and this time followed, the Supreme Court's "insistence that the federal courts must tolerate 'serious' arbitral errors."l 22 identified that, "in most cases, it will suffice to enforce the award that the arbitrator appeared to be engaged in interpretation, and if there is doubt [the court] will presume that the arbitrator was doing just that." 1 23
The opinion on rehearing offered the flip side of the coin, illustrating the basic Trilogy principles of arbitration and suggesting a changed approach by the Sixth Circuit in reviewing awards.124 Although the court maintained that the "'arguably construing' inquiry . . . will permit only the most egregious awards to be vacated," it acknowledged that this approach is necessary and significant because it "respects the parties' decision to hire their own judge to resolve their disputes, a view that respects the finality clause in most arbitration agreements . . . , 125 The three judges who concurred in part and dissented in part agreed with the majority that the four-part test must be abandoned and acknowledged that the test had "allowed [the Sixth Circuit] too much latitude to review the merits of arbitrator interpretations of collective bargaining agreements, in contravention of the dictates of the Supreme Court's Steelworkers Trilogy."l26 However, the three judges felt that the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court, a result of only two post-Trilogy decisions by the Court,127 called for the adoption of another test, one that replaced the four-part test with "an inquiry that looks only for 'procedural aberrations' committed by the arbitrator, not for legal error. Courts are not authorized to review the arbitrator's decision on the merits despite allegations that the decision rests on factual errors or misinterprets the parties' agreement. . . . [I]f an arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, the fact that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36-38 (1987) (reminding litigants that the courts have a limited role in labor-arbitration decisions and noting that "as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within his scope of authority," even "serious error" does not allow the court to overturn the decision). As the lower courts' defiance continued, the Supreme Court sent "strong signals" to the lower courts to defer to the judgment of arbitrators. 47 In Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, the Court reemphasized that "[c]ourts are not authorized to review the arbitrator's decision on the merits despite allegations that the decision rests on factual errors or misinterprets the parties' agreement." 48 Lower courts will sometimes set aside an award if the courts believe the arbitrator inaccurately defined a term of the collective-bargaining agreement. For instance, the Fifth Circuit. vacated an arbitrator's award because it disagreed with the arbitrator's interpretation of a clause in a collectivebargaining agreement, which allowed the employer to discharge employees without notice for "immoral conduct." 49 In this case, the arbitrator had reinstated an employee who was discharged immediately following her employer's discovery that she had lied about why she needed to leave work for forty-five minutes. o The Fifth Circuit held that, by definition, lying was immoral conduct, and therefore the arbitrator's award should be reversed because it was not derived from the contract.' 5 ' In another Fifth Circuit case, the court acknowledged the limited nature of review under section 301, but then invoked the use of a "plain meaning" rule,' 52 which postulated that a court may set aside an award because the The collective-bargaining agreement prohibited discharge without "proper cause."
55 Despite Captain Ritchie's gross carelessness, the arbitrator found no proper cause for discharging Ritchie because prior company mishaps involving other employees had resulted in actual collisions and damages, but led to no disciplinary action for those employees.' 56 The Fifth Circuit held that Ritchie's gross carelessness was sufficient cause for disciplinary action.' 57 In reality, the Fifth Circuit used its view that gross carelessness was sufficient cause for termination as justification to vacate the reinstatement portion of the arbitral award.
58
Yet another ground exists for courts to challenge labor-arbitration-awardspublic policy.1 9 The Eighth Circuit set aside an arbitrator's award that reinstated an employee who had violated federally mandated safety regulations on the grounds that the employee could not appreciate the potential danger of the situation because his job training had not adequately addressed the scenario that the employee encountered. 160 The Eighth Circuit vacated this award in part because it found that, similar to other cases where arbitration awards had been abandoned, the employee deliberately acted in a way that jeopardized public safety.'61
Similarly, in employer-promulgated arbitration systems, courts may modify or decline to enforce arbitration agreements that they find unconscionable. Courts derive this power from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 16 which states that written arbitration agreements are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."l 64 Absent partiality, fraud, corruption, or misconduct, a court cannot set aside an arbitration award. 165 It would seem that the FAA's stringent standard for vacating arbitration awards would prevent the lower courts from engaging in mischief through judicial review. But, despite the Supreme Court's warning that public-policy exceptions should be used sparingly, the lower courts tend to apply these exceptions more broadly.1 For instance, a panel of the Ninth Circuit applied public-policy reasoning to a straight-forward discharge case, only to be corrected by an en banc decision. 167 Today, the circuit courts are split on whether Congress has precluded judicial review of certain National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB) proceedings. 168 The NRAB is authorized by Congress to adjudicate grievances of railroad employees and their carriers if the parties are unable to resolve their disputes through the grievance procedures specified in their collectivebargaining agreements. 169 Congressional amendments in 1966 stated grounds on which parties could seek judicial review of NRAB orders.
1 70 But the courts of appeals are in disagreement about whether that provision precludes judicial review of NRAB proceedings for due process violations.171
This confusion seems to arise from a previous Supreme Court decision. 1 72 Consequently, some circuits have held that review was precluded for dueprocess claims beyond those specifically articulated in the Railway Labor Act,173 though other circuits have held that review was available. 174 The issue resurfaced in 2009, but the Supreme Court did not have the occasion to answer the question of whether a reviewing court may set aside an NRAB adjudication for incompatibility with due process; the case was decided on statutory grounds, leaving no "genuinely in controversy" issue. 1 75 In essence, a trend has emerged since the Steelworkers Trilogy, whereby lower courts continue to challenge labor-arbitration awards. The Supreme Court held that "a collective bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law."so The circuit courts are not alone in the tendency to challenge and diverge from Supreme Court precedent. Although the circuit courts sometimes seem to rely on their own reasoning, often justifying their actions through distinguishing cases based on the facts,' some critics would argue that the Court itself diverges unnecessarily from logic. For example, critics target Pyett, asserting that the majority operated under "an assumption that was both a non sequitur and erroneous," and the decision was "rooted in so many errors and misconceptions that it is difficult to know where to begin." 1 82 Others are unsure of the impact the Pyett decision will have on employers, employees, Whereas labor arbitration operates to avoid industrial strife and litigation, commercial arbitration functions differently.
IV. THE TREND FOR
The laws surrounding commercial arbitration are inspired by contract law and principles of practicality.189 Notwithstanding the differences between the two categories of arbitration, the lower courts-and, at times, the Supreme Court-cite interchangeably to labor and commercial cases arising under the FAA in their discussions of whether to order arbitration. 190 It appears that under the FAA, the hostility toward commercial arbitration that existed at the time of the Trilogy has faded almost entirely. 191 On the other hand, the enforceability of arbitration awards has not undergone a drastic change in status over time. The traditional, common-law view pertaining to the enforceability of arbitration awards was that awards should be enforced, regardless of the court's inclinations.192 The FAA continued this tradition by maintaining a strict standard for vacating arbitration awards. 193 Professors Michael LeRoy and Peter Feuille advance a competing approach to the theory that courts today sometimes exercise an improper level of judicial deference. 4 They argue that statistical analysis of original cases, rather than textual analysis of appellate decisions, is a more accurate gauge of court behavior.' 95 To support their thesis, LeRoy and Feuille cite to improved arbitration-award confirmation rates in their most recent measurement period.196 Notwithstanding these improvements, it appears the federal courts either lack a clear consensus with regard to the limitations on review of arbitral awards, or recognize, but prefer to ignore, those limits. 97 Because neither scenario bodes particularly well for the future of arbitration, it matters not what "gauge" one uses; rather, the end result-that courts still continue to diverge from established principles-is the better indicator of courts' levels of deference.
Since In R.H. Cochran & Associates, the district court vacated the arbitration award because it found that the arbitrators acted outside the scope of their authority when they ruled on an untimely filed grievance.205 The Sixth Circuit majority held that, because the record provided sufficient evidence that Cochran, the employer, made a timeliness objection before the arbitration panel, and that the Union did not file a grievance within the required thirty-day period-a fact that the Union conceded-the arbitration panel lost its "authority to consider the merits of the grievance." 206 The majority stated that it was applying a deferential standard of review and, as such, could not say that the district court committed clear error. 207 The dissent noted that arguments not raised before an arbitrator are waived in a motion to vacate the arbitration award; it disagreed, however, with the majority regarding whether Cochran had in fact presented its timeliness 208 argument to the arbitration panel.
If the dissent is correct in its assertion that the proverbial ball was in Cochran's court to raise the timeliness issue in front of the arbitration panel, and Cochran failed to do so, then it would appear that the court should not have vacated the arbitration award. It could easily be said that, in the present case, the court failed to defer to the arbitrators, in contravention of the Steelworkers Trilogy principles.
V. CONCLUSION
The landmark Steelworkers Trilogy decisions were clear and explicit: a court ordinaril should defer to the arbitrator's decision and uphold the arbitrator's award. 20 This deference to private labor arbitration, most immediately and with some frequency, honors what the parties contracted for through collective bargaining-a final and binding decision by a third-party arbitrator. More strategically, this application enhances the integrity of the very nature of arbitration, one of the genuine cornerstones of labor-management dispute resolution.
Various circuit courts have historically struggled to divorce themselves from their natural powerful and authoritative position as decision-makers in order to defer to arbitration awards.2o On its face, the arbitration dynamic appears hierarchically chaotic. Yet, it properly occurs every day, as powerful, federal judges defer to labor arbitrators' decisions.211 Although an understandable, palpable sense of unease remains-and as difficult as it may be for somecourts must defer to potentially mediocre arbitral decisions. In light of the Trilogy's precepts, "the requirement [is] that [judges] tolerate 'serious' legal errors in arbitration awards." 212 It was common practice, and deeply problematic, that courts vacated awards with which they substantively disagreed. This approach not only sidestepped the rationale of the Supreme Court; it had the potential to substantially debilitate the stature of the labor-arbitration process as a whole by encouraging parties on the losing end of arbitration to challenge the decisions in federal court. This, on the whole, can pemiciously foster floods of litigation by giving the discouraged party a "second bite at the apple," a concept that undermines the ability of arbitration to be a final and binding resolution of labormanagement disputes.
Until its en banc reaffirmation of judicial fealty to the unvarnished Trilogy principles, the maverick Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was at the forefront of the activist judiciary predisposed to readily vacate arbitration awards.213 It did so at an alarming and accelerating rate, while simultaneously invoking the Trilo as little more than an inherently malleable, rhetorical policy instrument.
However reluctance to abandon their traditional responsibilities." 2 15 The Sixth Circuit in its opinion cited the right cases and made the appropriate observations about the limited scope of its review, but then it read the contract to admit of only one meaning and, because the arbitrator's reading was different, it concluded he exceeded his authority by adding a term and that his award did not draw its essence from the contract.216 But in fact, according to the Trilogy, the Sixth Circuit exceeded its authority.
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Since Michigan Family Resources, Inc. III, the trend in the Sixth Circuit dramatically changed direction and the court finally embraced the importance of deferring to an arbitrator's award despite disagreeing with the substance of 21 the decision.218 Ultimately, collective bargaining cannot be compromised by interventionist courts cavalierly intruding into labor-management alternate dispute resolution that the private parties reserved to arbitration by the express terms of their collective-bargaining agreements.
Michigan Family Resources, Inc. III has ramifications far beyond the crucible of labor-management relations. The future viability of much of commercial arbitration, for example, is calibrated, at least in part, via reference to developments in the law and practice of labor arbitration. The fundamental dynamic of each remains constant-that is, the resolution of disputes decided by a neutral third-party arbitrator, not the courts.219 Accordingly, lower courts must respect the limitation on the review of arbitral awards to preserve the nature of arbitration. Without a consistent approach among lower courts that adheres to the Supreme Court precedent, the power of arbitrators in both labor and commercial aspects will suffer indefinitely, and the pillars of arbitration will ultimately erode.
In the fifty years since the Steelworkers Trilogy, arbitration has continued to provide a very effective mechanism for resolving labor-management disputes.220 However, the process has certainly not been uniformly smooth, and the efficacy of arbitration has been periodically jeopardized by many lower courts' failure to adhere to the guidelines articulated by the Supreme Court in 215. Brief of National Academy of Arbitrators, supra note 7, at 7. The brief also noted that "the Supreme Court's decisions require judicial restraint and compel enforcement of the award, even if the Court believes the arbitrator was wrong, or that the contract language is not susceptible to the arbitrator's interpretation, or, indeed, even if the decision is wrong." Id 220. Brief of National Academy of Arbitrators, supra note 7, at 16 (explaining that arbitration is typically "faster and less costly than litigation and, most important, final"). 221. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567-69 (explaining that the courts should not weigh the merits of a case before them that have been addressed by arbitration provided for in an agreement); Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 585 (noting that questions concerning the substance of a dispute covered by a collective-bargaining agreement that provides for arbitration are for the arbitrator to decide, not the courts); Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 596 ("The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements.").
222. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 46-47 (1987) (reiterating the deference courts should afford to arbitration awards made under a collective-bargaining agreement).
223. Major League Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001) (per curium) ("Judicial review of a labor-arbitration decision pursuant to such an agreement is very limited. Courts are not authorized to review the arbitrator's decision on the merits despite allegations that the decision rests on factual errors or misinterprets the parties' agreement.") [Vol. 60:47 
